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Summary
This short essay examines the relationship between 
academic research and policy with particular empha-
sis on the question of whether a critical criminology 
can engage in academic critique at the same time as 
engaging in policy oriented research. Recognising that 
critical criminology falls between theory and politics 
criminologists are urged to adopt pragmatic, strategic 
positions as they negotiate their role in contentious deba-
tes and practical minefi elds. It is concluded that a critical 
criminology must try not only to think the unthinkable 
about crime, but also to speak the unspeakable about the 
conditions in which and by which it is known.
I. Preface
A few years ago, a newspaper report told the 
story of a businessman who intended to name 
his sailing ship after his wife, Alice. On the 
appointed day, Alice stood on the quay, cham-
pagne bottle in hand, ready to perform the cer-
emony, intoning, ‘I hereby name this ship’… 
when suddenly the bottle fl ew out of her hand. 
In the kafuffl e which followed, Alice failed to 
complete her sentence as intended. Later her 
husband consulted the harbour master about 
repeating the naming ceremony, but was told 
that it would be unlucky to change the ship’s 
name after it had been formally baptised with 
the champagne. The ship, therefore, is now 
called ‘Bugger’…
Now for those of you who are thinking that, 
actually, Alice’s story has nothing to do with 
the topic of this article, you are most prob-
ably right – and wrong. For one of the ironies 
about most articles on anything prefaced by 
the word ‘critical’ is that they can often sound 
like sermons. They usually start off by saying 
that all other brands of criminology, especially 
problem-oriented administrative criminology, 
are not the ‘real thing’, that they are in any 
case purveyed by people who are either in the 
pay of the state or would like to be in the pay 
of the state, and then the bulk of the article is 
devoted to telling non-critical criminologists 
how they can turn to criticism and be saved. 
But, from the perspective which I shall outline 
in this article, all criminology, whether it be 
called policy-oriented or critical, is as neces-
sary a constituent of ‘critical criminology’ as 
ideology is of knowledge. So I thought that 
an article beginning with the story of ‘A Ship 
Called Bugger’ would at least not sound quite 
so sanctimonious at the beginning – as it un-
doubtedly will by the end.
And the story also has a second, and more im-
portant function – but I hope that will become 
clearer as we proceed.
II. Introduction
I was asked to write about the relationships 
between ‘research and policy’, and I have in-
terpreted ‘research and policy’ to refer to the 
 1 This is a reworked version of a paper that originally 
appeared as ‘Critical criminology? In Praise of an 
Oxymoron and its Enemies’ In: K. Carrington and R. 
Hogg (eds) (2000). Critical Criminology. Cullompton: 
Willan: 243-250.
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relationships between academic research and 
policy. I make the distinction between ad-
ministrative research and academic research 
because whereas administrative criminology 
can quite respectably and usefully engage in 
producing descriptions – statistical or other-
wise – about already known phenomena, aca-
demic research should go beyond description 
either to explain why social phenomena take 
the form they do, or to transform the ways in 
which people perceive them, or the relation-
ships between them.
On those defi nitions, therefore, it follows that, 
to put it bluntly, there is no necessary relation-
ship between academic research and policy; 
because whereas academic research should 
question what is already known in order to 
produce the presently unknown, policy-mak-
ing is about choosing between already-known 
alternatives. Sure, research may be invoked to 
support one or other of those alternatives, or 
may be commissioned to produce more infor-
mation about what is already known, but, none 
the less, research and politics have different 
conditions of existence and are not reducible 
one to the other. In other words, policy cannot 
be read off any set of research fi ndings, and 
research alone does not, indeed cannot, decide 
whether or not a ‘policy’ works.
However, although there are no necessary re-
lationships between academic research and 
policy-making and policy makers, there are 
a number of contingent relationships – and at 
the present time they are as follows:
 i. Policy makers give grants to people will-
ing to do research which is usually called ad-
ministrative research i.e. it investigates aspects 
of the criminal justice system from within 
already-known parameters;
 ii. Questions on funding applications often 
imply that research seen to be useful by prac-
titioners will be favoured;
 iii. University research funding assessments 
and competitions are often thought to favour 
theoretical articles in refereed journals, based 
on the ‘blue skies’ research aiming to produce 
something new, which, in the case of criminol-
ogy, will tend to be articles calling into ques-
tion the taken-for-granted nature of criminal 
justice in contemporary societies;
 iv. BUT, access to penal institutions and 
other criminal and penal justice research sites 
is usually dependent upon a researcher being 
able to claim that the fi ndings will be useful 
either to the research hosts or in the public 
interest;
 v. AND, what about if you are a ‘blue-skies’ 
researcher who would like to call into question 
the present system and attempt to have some 
hand in changing it? Well, in that case, you 
sure got problems!
So it is around that last question that the discus-
sion in this paper will revolve. And I am going 
to outline two answers that have been given 
to that question. Answer 1 I call ‘Criminology 
is Damned’; Answer 2, ‘Critical Criminol-
ogy Lives’. As I disagree with the ‘Criminol-
ogy is Damned’ position and wish to promote 
Critical Criminology I will only briefl y outline 
the position of the Damned. After that, the 
rest of the paper will be in praise of critical 
criminology.
Answer 1: Criminology is Damned
The following position, called ‘criminology 
is damned’ is one that is perennially favoured 
by criminologists disheartened by the diffi -
culties of speaking truth to power. First, they 
argue, criminology is, and has always been, 
ideologic ally tainted by its empirical referents, 
crime and criminal justice, which are them-
selves concepts rooted in the social orders of 
capitalism, patriarchy, racism and globalism, 
structures which, furthermore, defi ne crime 
and criminal justice in the way they do in order 
to maintain and legitimate the status quo. As a 
consequence, they say, all policy-related (ad-
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ministrative research) must take for granted 
(and thereby not threaten) the present order of 
things and, (so the more conspiracy-oriented 
versions of this story go), its practitioners will 
be rewarded by further research grants. Con-
versely ‘blue skies’ research which questions 
the status-quo will either not be funded or, 
worse, will be ignored, and its practitioners 
accordingly suffer from a sense of futility.
Now, criminologists who endorse this charac-
terisation of the relationships between research 
and policy, but who would, nonetheless, like 
their research to be useful in terms of shaping 
policy, are faced with a dilemma. They can 
either do administrative criminology and feel 
uncomfortable about legitimating an unjust 
system, or they can do ‘blue skies’ theoretical 
research, and nobody, least of all anyone in 
government, will take a blind bit of notice of 
their work. (Or in the most extreme and pure 
of cases, in damning criminology they repeat-
edly damn themselves – by portraying any 
professional success which they may have as 
evidence that their own work is by defi nition 
tainted and they themselves already co-opted 
by the state – though, of course, they still 
cash their state-funded university pay-cheques 
every month.)
Now, I take issue with the assumptions inher-
ent in Answer 1. For, insofar as the criticism 
about ideological contamination (as criminol-
ogy’s critics would see it) applies to criminol-
ogy, it applies to all social science, indeed all 
science. All knowledge is rooted in ideology, 
but, just as Alice could break the bottle and 
unexpectedly produce the hitherto unthought-
of ‘ship called bugger’, so too, can we, through 
theoretical work, produce the new, however 
much rooted our research may be in policy 
concerns. But secondly, I take issue about 
the way in which Answer 1 erases the space 
of politics. For the state is not as monolithic 
as portrayed in Answer 1, nor does it have 
an omniscient feedback mechanism which 
somehow enables it to ‘know’ how to defend 
itself against all critique. Of course, crime and 
criminal justice are political and ideological 
constructs, and the researcher who wants to 
change policy will have to make ethical and 
political judgments about the likely research 
outcomes of particular research tasks. Many 
research tasks may be neutral, many fi ndings, 
even in administrative criminology may be 
unforeseen, and the many and varied ways in 
which research is used, may be quite accept-
able to the individual researchers who will 
have their own values and politics. Conversely, 
the most radical critiques may well be incorpo-
rated into offi cial discourses where they may 
be used to support outcomes which are totally 
unintended by their propagators. These are 
personal and political issues to resolve. What 
I am going to do now, in discussing Answer 
2, is to outline a strategy for researchers who 
wish to pursue critical research which may also 
have policy relevance.
Answer 2: Critical Criminology Lives
First a defi nition:
1. A critical criminology is one that constantly 
refuses to accept that the signifi cance of 
any crime-related phenomenon is already 
known for all time and all places. Thus it 
has to work with the already known in the 
hope of producing the as-yet unthought-of. 
In order to do that,
2. A critical criminology must beware at least 
6 enemies to the critical project: they are 
theoreticism, politicism, populism, value-
free and value-added, scientism, trimming 
and clubbing. However, because these en-
emies can only be known through recogni-
tion of their integral and critical opposites 
– though never in a dualistic confi guration 
– I will frame the discussion around the dif-
fi culties of working and writing both within 
and without those contradictions – and for 
each one I will make a practical application, 
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by raising and answering some questions 
that have given me some diffi culty over the 
years –and still do.
1. AGAINST Theoreticism: 
FOR Theory
For as long as I have been doing sociological 
analysis, I have had an ambivalence about the 
role of theory in critical social research. On the 
one hand I hold totally to the view that a coher-
ent theoretical framework (either explanatory 
or interpretive) is an essential prerequisite to 
any type of analysis at all, but especially for 
a critical analysis which should produce new 
knowledge. On the other hand, it seems to me 
that within the practice of sociology and crimi-
nology there has perennially been a tendency 
toward an élitest theoreticism, the defi ning 
characteristics of which are themselves often 
contradictory: on the one hand, because the 
relationships (or not) between the empirical 
(or nominative) referent and theory are always 
open to question, there is often the implication 
that the less relevance a theory might have to 
the empirical referent the better; while on the 
other, there is, equally often, the implication 
that a theory has certain predictive qualities 
which have an all-time one-to-one relation-
ship with the empirical phenomenon, and, 
therefore, that a politics can be read off from 
a theory. Any such stance – that is, any one 
which presupposes that a politics can be read 
off from a theory, and, which in so presup-
posing, confuses the empirical object with the 
theoretical object – fails to grasp two critical 
principles: that the ordering of things can al-
ways be otherwise; and that the conditions for 
change constantly change. (In practical terms 
this means that critical criminologists should 
refuse to attempt to dilute their theories to ap-
pease populist government research agencies 
and should not apologise for using theoretical 
concepts when engaging in analysis. It seems 
to me that we should not apologise for doing 
academic work within the academy and should 
avoid implications that we have an obligation 
to be popularisers or purveyors of our own 
research.)
2. AGAINST Politicism: 
FOR Politics
Politicism is the opposite of theoreticism – an 
assumption that a theory can be devised in 
the service of a politics. In the 1980s and 
1990s, left realists like Jock Young fell into 
the trap of politicism when they argued that 
because a left realist theory was designed to 
incorporate all popular concerns about crime 
it would have more chance of being incor-
porated into criminal justice policy. This, in 
my opinion, was the main cause of the per-
spective’s lack of coherence and inability to 
produce any new, critical knowledge at all. 
Having said that, I did admire the left real-
ists for taking an explicit political stance, for 
making their domain assumptions clear, and, 
at least on the political front, not engaging in 
trimming. (The practical application of that 
is that I do not think academics when asked 
about the relevance of their theories should 
be frightened to say ‘relevant to whom?’. But 
I think that when they use their own research 
in the service of a politics they should make it 
quite obvious why they are doing it: e.g. they 
should not be frightened to say that they are 
anti-prison campaigners, feminists, socialists 
or whatever.)
3. AGAINST Populism: 
FOR interventionism
One of the dilemmas of a critical criminology – 
or a political party (as New Labour in England 
regularly informs its Old Labour relicts) is that 
unless its ideas are disseminated to politicians, 
they will have no effect on policy at all – they 
will be stillborn. Yet, in order to popularise 
a critical theory or analysis, it is often neces-
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sary to trim it till it loses its radical or political 
edge, and is ripe for incorporation into prevail-
ing ideologies. It has therefore seemed to me 
that critical criminologists should recognise 
a division of labour – they must retain their 
academic integrity when writing theoretically 
– that is, they must refuse to sweeten the theo-
retical pill – whilst at the same time working 
with campaigning groups and journalists to try 
to infl uence the types of radical and journalis-
tic interventions that can be made. However, 
that is diffi cult in England at the present time 
when the government repressively promotes 
a particular conception of social science as a 
pseudo-scientifi c justifi cation for its own poli-
cies. Which brings me to… scientism
4. AGAINST scientism: 
FOR science
One of the more reprehensible foibles of 
England’s present government is that it has 
continued its predecessors’ practice of quite 
explicitly confl ating government-interest with 
a particular scientifi c method – that is, empiri-
cist quantitative method – and then elevating 
that method as the only one guaranteed to de-
liver truth. Thus, it claims that all arguments 
for change, especially radical change, have to 
be ‘evidence-based’. Such a reasonable and 
disarming edict! Until one remembers how 
it works out. For instance, during the 1990s 
– when I was conducting research on home-
lessness it was constantly claimed by the Tory 
governments that nothing could be done about 
homelessness until the numbers of homeless 
people had been ascertained. As most home-
lessness is hidden, and offi cial homelessness 
has a most eccentric defi nition, nothing was 
done about homelessness.
You know the story. But where it took a new 
twist under the 1980s Tory administrations 
is that this scientism or pseudo-scientifi city 
(pseudo because it elevates one conception of 
science into a truth – a procedure which leads 
to an ideological closure) was imposed not 
only on the academic community but also on 
the evaluation of all professional knowledge 
and practice, including that of criminal justice 
professionals. This emphasis on positivistic 
auditing has continued to this day, and has 
been effective not only in ‘papering over’ some 
of the worst cracks in the system but also at 
silencing critics from within the system who 
have nowadays become overburdened with the 
very paperwork upon which both the ‘truth’ of 
their own system and their promotion within it 
will depend. Thus pseudo-scientifi c procedure 
has recently been strengthened in its perennial 
role of disciplining critics of the status quo. 
Indeed, I myself witnessed an extreme instance 
of measurement madness in Scotland, when an 
offi cial in the Scottish Offi ce remarked that 
it would be impossible to audit the impact of 
measures to reduce suicides in Cornton Vale 
because, and I quote, ‘We just don’t have 
enough suicides to do a proper study’.
5. AGAINST value-free 
and value-added: 
FOR moral discourse
As we all know, issues as to whether or not 
social science can be ‘value-free’ have long 
dominated academic social science debate. 
Here, I will not pose the question with regard 
to criminology, because, fi rst of all, I think 
that it is obvious that no social science can 
be value-free; and secondly, because I cannot 
imagine why anyone should ever want it to be. 
Unfortunately, the ‘evidence-based’ political 
rhetoric in England is not only inseminating 
debates about social policy, but also: a whole 
range of other social assessments, for example 
– and poles apart – the evaluation of grant 
applications; and the evaluation of prison re-
gimes. In the former it leads to a refusal to 
recognise that all science has a moral dimen-
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sion; in the latter, it leads to an erasure of moral 
discourse from debates about how prisoners 
should be treated.
First grant applications: there is such an em-
phasis on the importance of quantitative re-
search in England now that even spelling out 
the domain assumptions that provoke one 
research question rather than another risks 
being labelled as ‘bias’. Thus, when I recently 
stated in a grant application that one reason 
why I was looking at alternatives to women’s 
imprisonment was because I subscribed to 
a previous Conservative Home Secretary’s 
expressed opinion that ‘prisons make [bad] 
people worse’ a member of the commission-
ing panel expressed concern that I admitted to 
holding ‘biased’ views on imprisonment. Yet, 
I was putting forth this domain assumption as 
a necessary procedure for the kind of science 
that I practise. Even more ironically – given 
the objections to ‘bias’ – in every application 
to the Research Council applicants are required 
to say how the research will ‘add value’ and all 
research applications have to be assessed by 
‘users’. Two obvious questions arise: whose 
values? and which users? And how does one 
know how to answer these questions unless 
one always and already knows the answers to 
the research questions and whose interests they 
will serve? And here, why not tell the truth? 
In several research applications I have quite 
explicitly expressed the hope that the main 
people to benefi t from the research will be poor 
women. Sometimes I have said ‘I don’t know’. 
Sometimes I have said that I hope that other 
academics should benefi t. I refuse to be paid 
as an academic and continuously apologise for 
what I do. I still got the grants.
 Now, it is in this context that I presently 
feel very strongly that critical criminologists 
should resist political attempts to impose only 
one type of research method on social science 
and, instead of kowtowing to blatant political 
interest engage in an unfashionable crusade to 
bring ‘morals’ back into public discourse about 
the relationships between social and criminal 
justice. And I have chosen the term morals 
deliberately.
When I was recently doing research in the 
United States I was asked how one could 
evaluate a programme for homeless drug users 
which was not having much success in terms of 
immediately turning young women away from 
drug usage, but which was improving their gen-
eral health, increasing their education levels 
and, in some cases (though only in some cases) 
reducing the frequency of their being in  trouble 
with police and courts. When I asked the prog-
ramme leaders whether they could make an ar-
gument that attendance at the Programme was 
a ‘good in itself’, or whether they could put 
forward arguments based on the morality of 
providing shelter for otherwise homeless and 
destitute women, they were quite troubled and 
slightly embarrassed. The immediate response 
was to inquire as to whether I was, as they put 
it, ‘religious’; and, when I replied that I was 
not, they went on to explain to me that to talk 
of either ‘moral good’ or morality would make 
their fi nancial backers think that the project 
leaders themselves were employed by a reli-
gious organisation, and that that would not go 
down very well. Nor they said, did they want 
to be seen as ‘do-gooders’. They wanted to be 
seen as realists. Yet they were doing good, and 
their answers to my interview questions sug-
gested that ‘doing good’ had been one of their 
main objectives in setting up the programme. 
I am not criticising their strategy. What I am 
regretting is that what I saw just one instance 
of in the United States, mirrors the dominant 
situation in England today, where profession-
als in the criminal justice system have to do 
good by stealth for fear of being seen as being 
unprofessional ‘do-gooders’ whose non-quan-
tifi able moral or qualitative inputs into their 
work are defi ned not only as being non-audit-
able but also, and, consequently, as having ‘no 
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value’; a discursive move, in fact, where the 
moral dimension of both social policy and so-
cial science is suppressed.
6. AGAINST trimming and 
clubbing: FOR scientifi c 
integrity
By now, many of you will have realised that 
what I am calling a ‘critical’ criminology 
would be no more and no less than one which 
adheres to the liberal, classical ideal of science 
– that it should be: open; constantly recognis-
ing, questioning, and, if necessary, denying the 
conditions of its own existence; and neither 
‘trimming’ its questions to make them politi-
cally correct or expedient, nor ‘clubbing’ – that 
is, pulling its punches – either to conform with 
contemporary academic fashions or political 
prejudices, or in response to downright bul-
lying by either political or academic powers-
that-be, or from those one would want to be 
seen by as being OK. For above all it seems 
to me that a critical criminology must try not 
only to think the unthinkable about crime, but 
also to speak the unspeakable about the con-
ditions in which and by which it is known. 
(And in practical terms being against clubbing 
means that you have also to court unpopularity 
with people that you would like to agree with. 
Campaigning groups that I have worked with 
have been very angry because I have refused to 
say that women could not be violent; because 
I would not vilify prison offi cers; and because 
I would not pass on to them information I had 
received confi dentially.)
SO, IN CONCLUSION…
I am beginning to think that the concept ‘criti-
cal criminology’ has indeed provoked a ser-
mon rather than an academic article, and that 
to be setting out the defi ning elements of a 
critical criminology is a rather inappropriately 
positivistic task. For, a critical criminology, 
falling as it does between theory and politics, 
is primarily about strategy; and therefore its 
protocols have to be very loosely binding on its 
practitioners, who will inevitably shape their 
practice according to both their own talents and 
calculation of the balance of political needs and 
forces at specifi c times; and who, moreover, if 
they have any political nous whatsoever, will 
keep their tactics to themselves. At moments 
of critical struggle, one person’s critical theory 
is likely to be seen as another person’s theo-
reticism and so on and so forth. Who cares? 
In my opinion, all that is really critical is: fi rst 
not to close-off debate; and, secondly, to refuse 
to collude in any criminology that refuses to 
question the already-known meanings of all 
crime phenomena.
Which brings me back to the fundamental 
project of this discussion of critical criminol-
ogy: to ask whether a critical criminology can 
engage in academic critique at the same time 
as engaging in policy oriented research?
And the answer, in the tradition of Thomas 
Mathiesen’s concept of the ‘unfi nished’ is yes.. 
and no. As the conditions for change, change, 
knowledge becomes ideology and in this sense, 
and as I remarked at the beginning, non-critical 
or administrative criminology is as necessary 
a constituent of ‘critical criminology’ as ide-
ology is of knowledge. But with this differ-
ence: administrative criminology will ‘never 
embarrass the minister’. Critical criminology, 
on the other hand, by working on the contra-
diction that the claims of law and knowledge 
to legitimacy must be both recognised and 
denied, can cherish a project that is forever 
played out in the comic relief of knowing that 
all knowledge, at the time of its recognition 
as such, is already otherwise. In saying ‘Yes, 
Minister’… but ‘No! Minister’, therefore, criti-
cal criminology continues an age-old scientifi c 
tradition: the fi erce belief that an essential pre-
requisite for the birth of the new is a capacity 
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to acknowledge the ‘Alice in Wonderland’ of 
offi cial criminology at the same time as being 
able to say, ‘Bugger Alice’.
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